Many organizations compete for customers while at the same time receiving substantial subsidies from e.g. the government. In this paper, we study the effects of two commonly observed subsidy systems on price-competing firms. First, we show that, for a given total budget available for subsidies, an open-ended per-unit subsidy results in fiercer price competition (lower prices and higher output) than a closed-ended subsidy allocated according to the firms' market shares. Second, which system generates the highest profits depends on the size of the subsidy. Moreover, welfare is higher under the open system for all but very high subsidy levels. Third, a market-share based subsidy makes collusive behavior between firms much harder. Our results, therefore, suggest a potential trade-off between short-run and long-run objectives. They may have important policy implications for the design of subsidy systems in, among others, education and the arts, where an important goal of the government is to widen the degree of participation.
Introduction
The revenues of many firms and organizations do not only stem from the prices they charge to their customers. In some instances, other sources of income may represent a considerable fraction of their revenues. For example, theatres, operas, museums, and other artistic organizations compete for audience while receiving at the same time significant subsidies from diverse governmental agencies and sponsoring firms.
1 Universities and other institutes of higher education directly compete for students, but in most countries they receive at the same time considerable government funding. 2 In some industrial sectors, firms fight for customers while receiving government subsidies for making use of environmentally-friendly production techniques (Fischer, 2003) . Finally, it is not unusual for sports leagues, for example, to allocate funds from a common revenue source, like broadcasting rights, among their league members (see e.g. Szymanski, 2003) .
These examples illustrate that firms and organizations compete for customers while at the same time receiving substantial subsidies from the government or from higher hierarchical levels within the organization they belong to. The reasons and goals for granting subsidies to firms or organizations are manifold. Governments may (i) subsidize artistically related activities to prevent their local cultural heritage from disappearing; (ii) provide subsidies when they have a social concern about the output level of a monopolistic firm (Segal, 1998) ; (iii) subsidize institutes of higher education for public benefits reasons that enhance efficiency (to support economic growth) and further expand participation rates (for distributional reasons, or to reduce social exclusion); countries grant production subsidies to clean-producing firms in order to promote the use of renewable energy sources. Private organizations may also have incentives to grant subsidies. For example, sports leagues redistribute common broadcasting revenues among their league members, subsidizing the weaker league members at the cost of the stronger teams, to preserve the degree of competitive balance between the different competing teams.
Although the structure of the subsidies provided can take many forms, a behaviorally relevant distinction is that between open-ended and closed-ended subsidy systems 3 .
Typical examples of open-ended funding are a fixed subsidy per unit (per spectator, per product sold, per enrolled student, etc.) or an ad valorem price subsidy. Consequently, the total cost of the system to the sponsoring organization obviously depends on demand responses to the price reduction induced by the subsidy; the ultimate effect therefore depends on costs and on own-and crossprice elasticities. Alternatively, closed-ended funding systems imply that a fixed total budget is available for distribution across the subsidized firms. With government subsidies, like enrollment subsidies for universities, the total budget will typically have been decided upon ex ante through the political process 4 . In other instances, such as sports leagues, the budget is the result of a sector-specific process (for example, overall broadcasting rights negotiated by the league or, individually, by every league member). The available budget is then distributed across firms according to a predetermined allocation mechanism; for example, subsidies could be granted according to firms' market share in total sector output.
While real-world subsidies typically involve complex allocation rules, examples of subsidies that are broadly consistent with one of the systems just described are frequently observed in practice. Examples of open-ended production subsidies are observed in international trade, see e.g. Collie (2000) , or the cultural sector (Van Der Ploeg, 2005) . A prominent education example is Denmark's "taximeter" model, in which universities get funding per passing student (see Kalpazidou et al. (2007) ). Examples of closed-ended market-share based systems can be found in education (for example, the funding of universities in Belgium), environmental economics (the redistribution of the revenues from emission taxes among polluters in Sweden, the system of output-based refunding of environmental taxes in the US (Fischer (2003) ), and in international trade (Krishna et al. (2001) ). Closed-ended subsidies other than those based on 3 Subsidies can be granted as a lump sum, or they can be linked to particular criteria like input use (e.g. size of the orchestra, maintenance cost of existing infrastructure, …), outputs (e.g. consumption units, attendance at a theatre performance, number of patients or passing students…), market share, etc. Our focus in this paper is on comparing a
per-unit open-ended system with market-share based closed-ended system. See below for more details. Lump-sum subsidies or subsidies based on use of specific inputs are not considered. Note that there are also numerous implicit ways of granting subsidies through favorable tax regimes, such as tax breaks for revenues, R&D investments, or private donations. 4 See Fethke (2006) for a bargaining approach in an open-ended framework.
market shares have been observed, for example, in models of entrepreneurial investment (Fuest and Tillessen (2005) ). (2003)). Under this system, producers are taxed according to their emissions, and total revenues are refunded based on the firm's market share in total output.
Third, at least one study has formally compared a closed-ended with an open-ended subsidy. In a recent paper, Fuest and Tillessen (2005) focus on subsidies to support entrepreneurial investment. However, the closed system they consider is of a totally different nature than the market-share based system studied in this paper. They study a subsidy that is limited to a maximum amount and compare it with an open system that affects investment decisions at the margin. They show that, contrary to expectations, the closed system is welfare superior when capital markets are subject to asymmetric information. hamper long-run competition may be less desirable, independent of their effects on pricing and output in the short-run.
The contribution of the paper is, therefore, twofold. First, we provide a detailed comparison of open-ended and market-share based closed-ended subsidy systems for prices, output, consumer surplus, firm profits and overall welfare. We show that, holding the total subsidy budget constant, a per-unit subsidy results in fiercer price competition than a marketshare based subsidy. As a result, it generates a larger market output and therefore is more effective at stimulating wider participation. Second, relative firm profits under the two systems depend on the size of the subsidy. Welfare under the open system exceeds that under the marketshare based system, except for very high subsidy levels. Third, we find that a per-unit subsidy has no effect on the incentives to collude, but a market-share based subsidy makes collusive behavior between firms much harder. Consequently, a trade-off between short-run and long-run objectives may exist in the sense that a closed system performs worse at stimulating participation, but higher funding reduces long-run incentives to collude; this is not the case under open-ended financing.
This paper has a number of obvious limitations. The model is highly stylized, ignoring many of the real-world complications of existing subsidy schemes. Moreover, it focuses on price competition between profit-maximizing organizations. This assumption may not be suited for all subsidized organizations we observe Although other objective functions could easily be conceived, profit maximizing behavior by the relevant firms or organizations serves as a useful benchmark 9 . However, it is worth noting that price competition in the US higher education market has increased significantly (see Winston and Zimmerman (2000) ). Although to a lesser extent, the further globalization of education may also result into more tuition competition between European universities. Moreover, although large sports teams no doubt are also interested in winning games and drawing large audiences, their entry on the stock market in the UK and France, among others, suggests that some price competition will become the rule rather than the exception, be it within the limits set by the league. We therefore believe that the model does capture the main ingredients of a broad range of subsidy systems.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the structure of the model and explain the properties of the open and closed subsidy systems. Section 3 derives the market outcomes under Bertrand competition for each of the two subsidy systems. Section 4 reports on a detailed welfare analysis of the two subsidy systems. In Section 5 we consider the implications of the two types of subsidies for the incentive to collude on the output market.
Extensions are described in Section 6. We summarize our conclusions in Section 7.
The model
There is a continuum of identical consumers with a separable, quadratic, and strictly concave utility function, linear in the numéraire good, so that we may ignore income effects. We define a consumer's utility by Hansmann (1981) has argued that many artistic companies (theatres, etc.) probably do not care about profit; instead, they may care about quality, attendance, revenues, etc. Similarly, the appropriate objective function for institutes of higher education is likely to be highly multi-dimensional (see, e.g., Winston (1999) 
By inversion, the demand system is readily obtained and equals
as long as quantities for both firms remain positive.
11 Note that our assumption on the parameter d implies positive and symmetric cross-price effects between both goods. One easily shows, using (2), that higher values of d yields larger cross-price effects.
We consider a duopolistic industry where one firm offers good 1 and the other firm sells good 2. Let each firm maximize its profits. Assume zero production costs to simplify the analysis. Firms receive revenues from two sources. First, they charge a price i p (admission fee, ticket price, etc.) for their goods or services; second, they receive a government subsidy. As a result, profit of firm i is given by
where i S denotes the subsidy firm i receives.
11 When firm j charges too high a price, firm i's demand shows a kink at some critical price of firm j for which i has a monopoly position (see Deneckere (1983) and Singh and Vives (1984) for a complete characterization). In this paper, we do not consider firm i's incentives to exclude firm j and become a monopolist when subsidies are available, see below.
We study two subsidy systems. First, under an "open-ended" system, the sponsoring organization (the government, say) provides an ex ante announced subsidy γ per unit of output.
The subsidy received by firm i , then, equals
Second, under the "closed" system we consider a fixed amount of available funding β , e.g. Using (1), the resulting necessary and sufficient first-order condition is:
d p dp
Firm i' reaction function can be written as: Reaction functions are upward sloping so that prices are strategic complements.
Moreover, a higher degree of substitutability (a larger d) increases the slope and decreases the intercept of each firm's reaction curve. The total effect of increased substitutability is that each firm optimally reacts with a lower price for any given price set by its competitor. The slope of the reaction functions
lies between zero and one, so that a stable Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Solving the two reaction functions for each firm's price, the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium looks like: (1 )(1 ) (1 )(2 )
3.2. Bertrand competition with closed-ended market-share based funding
In the closed-ended producer subsidy system we consider, the sponsoring organization (e.g., the government) fixes its total subsidy budget β beforehand. Each firm, then, competes for scarce resources, and receives a fraction of the total budget according to the allocation rule of the tournament. Here we focus on one commonly observed rule in which each firm receives a fraction of the budget according to its market share. 12 The problem for firm i is then to
The first-order condition can be written as, using (2):
p dp
Substituting the demand functions (2) 
This inequality holds whenever 1 d < , as we assumed.
Note that the demand structure of our model implies a symmetric equilibrium with i j= . From the first-order condition (11), we derive the slope of the reaction function as:
Therefore, as in the case of the open-ended subsidy system, the reaction functions are upward sloping. Again, as 1 d < , the slope is less than one, which guarantees a stable Nash equilibrium.
Interestingly, comparing (7) and (12), we see that a market-share based closed-ended subsidy system implies less responsive reactions of firms to price changes by the competitor than a per-unit open-ended subsidy. Since 1 d < , the slope of the reaction function in (12) is necessarily less than 0.5d , the slope under the per-unit subsidy derived in (7). The intuition for this difference in price-responsiveness is that, under the closed-ended system, a price increase by one firm imposes a positive externality on the competitor. To see this, we easily obtain, using
This positive effect of a price increase on the subsidy per unit, raises each firm's incentive to increase its own price; by doing so, it sells less but at the same time raises the subsidy it receives per unit of demand. More importantly, however, a price increase by one firm raises the subsidy per unit for the competitor, ceteris paribus. (In fact, in a symmetric equilibrium, one can show that a firm's price increase actually raises the total subsidy received by the competitor). This windfall revenue gain induces a less pronounced reaction of firm j to the price increase by firm i.
Note, by contrast, that a price increase under the open-ended per-unit subsidy system does not affect the level of the unit subsidy γ 13 .
Not surprisingly, using (11) we further find that raising β , the total budget available for subsidies, shifts the reaction functions downward:
For any price charged by firm j , firm i optimally charges a lower price to benefit from the increased government budget. Finally, the effect of a higher degree of substitution between both firms' products (a larger d) on the slope and height of the reaction functions can be shown to be ambiguous in general; under plausible conditions they are positive and negative, respectively (as in the per-unit subsidy case).
13 Of course, in either funding system a price increase by firm i reduces both its market share and total demand. Substituting these results in the first-order condition (11), the latter can be written as
Solving for p yields the Nash equibrium prices:
where ( 
Open-ended versus closed-ended funding: comparing efficiency and welfare
We noted above that a market share based closed-ended funding system implies (i) a lower price responsiveness after a price change by the competitor and (ii) an augmented incentive for each player to increase its price. In this section, we provide a more detailed comparison of the two subsidy systems in terms of prices, output, profits and welfare. We first compare the relative efficiency of the two systems in stimulating output with a given budget;
next we proceed to a comparison of profits and welfare.
4.1. Relative efficiency of the two subsidy systems Anderson et al. (2001) propose two ways to evaluate the efficiency of different taxes or subsidies. First, a subsidy instrument is more efficient than another if the former yields a higher output for a given subsidy budget. Second, a funding system is more efficient than another when it reaches the same output with a lower budget 14 . To fix ideas, we focus on the first definition.
We comment on the second one at the end of this sub-section.
We compare the open-ended and closed-ended funding subsidy system by assuming that the government decides to move from a closed to an open system, while holding the total subsidy cost constant. Let the total cost of the subsidy under the initial closed system be β . Let us denote the per-unit subsidy that accomplishes an unchanged total subsidy cost in the open system asγ .
In other words, this per-unit subsidy must satisfy Using the optimal quantities under a per-unit subsidy system (see (9)) we have that:
Solving the resulting quadratic equation forγ , we find:
where
15 From (8) , this subsidy per unit implies a Nash equilibrium price of
Substituting and working out yields
The equilibrium quantity demanded per firm is, using (17) in (9): 14 Anderson et al. (2001) show the two definitions are equivalent under mild conditions. 15 The other root involves a per-unit tax yielding a tax revenue of β . 
Finally, simple algebra shows that profit per firm is, using (17), (18) and (19):
Using the above results, we are now in a position to directly compare the two subsidy systems under the maintained assumption that the total subsidy cost to the government is equal. A comparison of (18) with the price under the initial closed system as in (14), shows that
since 0 1 d < < . Of course, comparing demands (see (19) and (15)) we find after simple algebra
We have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
The efficiency of a given budget β available for subsidies is higher for a per-unit subsidy than for a market-share based subsidy; the former results in fiercer price competition and a larger output than the latter.
Interpretation is easy. When a given subsidy budget β is available, there exists an appropriately chosen subsidy γ per unit in an open system that fully exhausts the available budget. This subsidy γ per unit results in lower consumer prices and a higher output as compared to the closed-ended subsidy system. A price increase under the open subsidy system reduces a firm's demand and total demand, but it has no effect on the subsidy per unit. In a closed subsidy system, when firm i changes its price, its demand changes in a similar fashion as under the open-ended system. However, it also raises the subsidy per unit for both players, since fewer units are sold. This change in the subsidy per unit explains why firms are less inclined to set a lower price in a closed-ended subsidy system as compared to the open-ended funding system. This results in a higher equilibrium price and, consequently, a lower total output. Finally, following Anderson et al. (2001) , in Appendix we show a corollary to the result of this section, viz. that a smaller total subsidy is needed to generate the same output effect under an open per-unit subsidy than under a subsidy based on market shares.
Welfare comparison of open and closed budget subsidies
In this subsection, we compare the comparative welfare effects of the two subsidy systems, taking account of consumers' surplus, firms' profits, and the cost of the subsidy to the government. Since the cost to the government is, by assumption, equal for the closed and open subsidy system, we only consider the sum of the surpluses for consumers and firms.
As the open system implies lower prices, consumers will be better off. This is confirmed by calculating consumers' surplus. This is easily shown to equal 2 (1 )
for both subsidy systems where q is the output level per firm. Using (19) and (15), the difference in consumer surplus can, after simple algebra, be written as
This is positive, since 1 d < .
Next, we compare profits under open and closed system, holding subsidies constant.
Noting that ˆ2
o i q β γ = , the profit difference per firm can be written as:
Using previous results and working out, we find that { } * *
(1 ) 2 1 2 1 (1 )
If d approaches one, the profit difference goes to zero, as it should. The term between square brackets is positive since 1 d < . However, it can be dominated by the negative term (-Z β ).
Therefore, the sign is, unfortunately, undetermined in general. At low subsidy levels ( β close to zero), profits under the open system are necessarily larger than under the closed one, while at high subsidy levels, profits are larger for the closed system 16 .
An informal but intuitive argument to explain this finding runs as follows. Assume for simplicity a reference point without subsidies so that initial profits are equal. Then note that if we introduce subsidies, by comparing (14) and (18) Finally, to compare total welfare (denote welfare by W), let us define welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and sector profits (minus the cost of the subsidy to the government, equal by assumption). Taking into account that profits were calculated per firm, we find: price, more demand, and higher net consumer surplus than in the closed system. The unit subsidy is, therefore, more efficient in that (Anderson et al. (2001) ) the same total subsidy yields more
output. The open system is preferred by consumers, but the effect on profit and on total welfare is ambiguous in general. We have the following proposition. 
Subsidy systems and potential collusion
In this section, we compare firms' incentives to collude in the two subsidy systems. To
find out under what subsidy system collusion is more likely, we assume firms make use of grim trigger strategies. Each firm compares the discounted stream of its profits under collusion with its profits from deviating (in the sense of undercutting its rival, who is assumed to stick to the collusive price), plus all future profits if the rival retaliates. The game reverts to the Nash equilibrium outcome for all future periods after one of the players deviated from the collusive outcome. Assuming a common discount factor 0 1 δ < < , collusion is beneficial to an arbitrary firm whenever 1 1
π π π are, respectively (i) each firm's profits when all firms respect the collusive arrangement (i.e. coll π is half the industry monopoly), (ii) the profits when the firm deviates and undercuts its rival, and (iii) the profits in the Nash equilibrium. Rearranging, we have that the
is sufficient for collusion to arise. We now study how subsidies affect the condition for collusion. 
Open subsidy system
Finally, firm i 's Nash equilibrium profit coincides with 2 * 2
(1 )(1 )
We want to find out how an increase in the subsidy γ affects firm i 's condition
for collusion. Substitution of (26), (27) and (28) in the inequality for the discount rate immediately shows that the critical discount factor is independent fromγ . With hindsight, this is no surprise, as the subsidy acts like a reduction in marginal cost for both firms. There is a total market effects in all cases, because the price goes down with higher subsidies. An open subsidy system has, therefore, no effect on the likelihood of collusive arrangements among firms. The intuition for this result is easy to grasp. Observe that the collusive price is independent of the total subsidy β . As a result, an increase in β does not result in a positive total market effect so that each firm's demand remains constant as well. Consequently, more subsidies necessarily lead to an increase in profit by 0.5 for both firms. However, when a firm deviates, the deviating firm reduces its price so that its market share rises above one half. An increase in the total subsidy therefore makes deviating behavior relatively more attractive as compared to collusion. Hence, larger subsidies reduce the incentives for collusion.
Our result suggests that raising the subsidy in a closed subsidy system reduces the potential for collusive behavior. If we take the zero subsidy case as starting point (or consider a
move from an open to a closed system whereby the subsidy rises) then this suggests that a closed system hampers the potential for collusion. Alternatively, we showed before that a closed system (holding demand constant) raises the total subsidy cost compared to an open system, hence there is less potential for collusion in a closed system. A potential trade off exists, therefore, in the sense that under a closed system the consumer loses (short-term loss), but at the benefit of less incentive to collude (long-run benefit).
Possible extensions
[to be completed]
Conclusions
Governments often offer subsidies to competing organizations because of their concern for output. Prominent examples are the arts and education industry where the widening of the degree of participation is a main objective for government. As a result, some firms compete for customers while at the same time receiving substantial public subsidies. This paper analyzes a stylized model with two price-competing, subsidized firms offering a differentiated product. We then compare the effects of two existing subsidy systems. In the open-ended system, the government provides a per unit subsidy that is known by firms ex ante.
In the alternative closedended system, a fixed subsidy is available for the sector as a whole, and the allocation rule is based on firms' output market shares.
We show that, holding the total subsidy budget constant, a per-unit subsidy results in fiercer price competition than a market-share based subsidy. As a result, it generates a larger market output and therefore is more effective at stimulating wider participation. Second, which system generates the highest profits depends on the size of the subsidy. Moreover, welfare is
higher under the open system for all but very high subsidy levels. Third, a market-share based subsidy makes collusive behavior between firms much harder. Our results, therefore, suggest a potential trade-off between short-run and long-run objectives and highlight important policy implications with respect to the design of subsidy systems.
